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 Security is an integral part of most software systems 
but it is not considered as an explicit part in the 
development process yet. Input validation is the most 
critical part of software security that is not covered in 
the design phase of software development life-cycle 
resulting in many security vulnerabilities. Our 
objective is to extend UML to new integrated 
framework for model driven security engineering 
leading to ideal way to design more secure software. 
Input validation in UML has not been addressed 
previously, hence we incorporate input validation into 
UML diagrams such as use case, class, sequence and 
activity. This approach has some advantages such as 
preventing from common input tampering attacks, 
having both security and convenience in software at 
high level of abstraction and ability of solving the 




Every software application is deployed today to 
accomplish some goals. However every application can 
be misused and faces threats from Internet-aware client 
applications running on PCs, to complex 
telecommunications and power systems accessible over 
the Internet.  The main source of vulnerability of 
systems has been recognized to be poor-quality 
software. So, software engineers must be aware of 
threats and engineer systems with credible defenses. 
Thus, security as a non-functional requirement plays a 
critical role in the development of many large-scale 
distributed software systems. In other words, while 
secure applications are also valid and robust ones, 
security is a specific non-functional requirement that 
has to be explicitly and carefully taken into account 
during analysis, design, implementation, testing, and 
deployment. The importance of this concept appears in 
the web applications because statistics show that 75% 
of security attacks occur on web applications [14].  We 
have all heard about web sites being hacked and 
private customer information being disclosed. This is 
only one example of the many potential security flaws 
in web applications. However, the breach of a 
company’s website can cause significant revenue 
losses, large repair costs, legal consequences and loss 
of credibility with customers. In Early 2003 a public 
university’s website was hacked into and thousands of 
social security numbers were released to the public [6]. 
Therefore, web applications must handle customer data 
and other electronic information as securely as possible 
[10, 6]. Security mechanisms and policies are generally 
added to the existing system as an afterthought 
(penetrate and patch approach), with all the problems 
of unsatisfied security requirements, integration 
difficulties, and mismatches between design models 
[11]. There are three main reasons for this [12]. First, 
security must cover every part of an application. 
Second, there are not enough tools to support security 
engineering. Finally developers do not have strong 
background on security and need guidelines for 
constructing secure applications. There is little work 
concerning the full integration of security and systems 
engineering from the earliest phases of software 
development. Although several approaches have been 
proposed for some integration of security, there is 
currently no complete methodology to assist 
developers of security sensitive systems. All this 
becomes a special concern when considering complex 
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security requirements such as those associated with 
applications, e-commerce etc [4].  
Software is designed to process a defined set of data.  
For example a word processor is designed to deal with 
document files not with audio or video files. When 
undefined set of data (audio/video files for word 
processor) sent to software, it might produce 
unpredictable results and many times an attacker by 
examining these undefined  set of data which know as 
malicious data, try to reach his/her goals. Input 
validation means validating data flow in the software 
before using them. On the other hand, invalidated input 
is that set of data, which is directly used by software 
without any validating mechanisms. 
Invalidated input is the most critical security flaw in 
applications, especially in web applications. Many 
security holes in applications are caused by invalidated 
inputs. Since entering invalid data, attackers take 
software into unpredictable conditions and exploit this 
condition for their own purpose. Common input 
tampering attacks include: forced browsing, remote 
command injection, cross site scripting, buffer 
overflows, format string attacks, SQL injection, cookie 
poisoning, and hidden field manipulation [16]. 
Consequently, before using data in the application, it 
must be completely and properly validated by security 
validating mechanisms. In addition, if validating 
mechanisms do no defined properly those data that 
come from believed–authoritative references might be 
reject, so, it annoys real application users [2]. In other 
words, some legitimate inputs will be incorrectly 
flagged as bad, leading to user frustration and some 
attacks will be incorrectly flagged as safe, leading to 
exploits. Input validation is a part of security 
engineering policies. The integration of security 
engineering into a model-driven software development 
approach has some advantages [12] 
1. Security requirements can be formulated and 
integrated into system design at a high level of 
abstraction. So it becomes possible to develop 
security aware applications that are designed with 
the goal of preventing violations of a security 
policy. 
2. The model information can be used to detect and 
correct design errors or to verify the correctness of 
the mapping between requirements and their 
realization in a design. 
3. It saves more budgets. 
Main problem of exciting literature is explained in 
section 2. In section 3, we provide some background of 
concepts which are used in the context of the article 
and we illustrate an overview of existing 
methodologies for designing secure software systems. 
In section 4, we represent our proposed model. With an 
example. Section 5 describes limitation in proposed 
model. And finally, we present a conclusion in section 
6.    
 
2. Problem Definition 
 
  According to our survey input validation has not been 
covered in any security approaches and existing 
literature does not sufficiently address it. We will 
provide an integrative approach supporting the 
integration of security and system engineering in order 
to model input validation in software. We discuss how 
input validation prevents from insecurity and how to 
present input validation in UML models. 
 
3. Literature Review 
 
  This part introduces some background information 
 and outlines the existing methodologies for input 
validation. 
 
3.1. Object Constraint Language (OCL) 
 
OCL is a formal language used to describe 
expressions in UML models. These expressions 
typically specify invariant conditions that must hold for 
the system being modeled or queries over objects 
described in a model. A UML diagram, such as a class 
diagram, is typically not refined enough to provide all 
the relevant aspects of a specifications. Thus, UML 
modeler can use OCL to specify application-specific 
constraints in their models [3]. OCL can be used for a 
number of different purposes:  
• as a query language  
• to specify invariants on classes and types in the 
class model 
• to specify type invariant for stereotypes 
• to describe pre and post conditions on operations 
and methods 
• to describe guards 
• to specify constraints on operations 
 
3.2. Regular expression 
 
A regular expression is a string that is used to 
describe or match a set of strings, according to certain 
syntax rules [15]. Much software such as word 
processors, applications, and programming languages 
use regular expression to search and manipulate text 
based on patterns.  Using regular expressions are very 
useful since they give a concise description of a set, 
without having to list all elements. For example, the set 
containing two strings "gray" and "grey" can be by 
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regular expression "gr[ae]y". Sometimes regular 
expression is called pattern. 
In our proposed model we employed regular 
expression in order to define security attributes. 
 
3.3. SQL Injection Attack 
 
One of the many web attacks used by hackers to steal 
data from organizations is SQL injection. Today, it is 
perhaps one of the most common application layer 
attack techniques [18]. This type of attack takes 
advantage invalidated inputs to web applications that 
allows hacker to inject SQL commands into say a login 
form to allow them to gain access to the data held 
within your database. In essence, SQL injection arises 
because the fields available for user input allow SQL 
statements to pass through and query the database 
directly. But in essence if input validation is in place, 
SQL statements would not be allowed to pass through 
the web interface.  
 
3.3.1 Example of SQL Injection Attack 
  Below is HTML code of a simple login form that 




<input name="username" type="text" id="userid"> 




User ID field is an identification number (e.g. 





WHERE userid = '$userid' 
AND password = '$password’ 
 
If the variables $userid and $password are requested 
directly from the user's input, this can easily be 
compromised. Suppose we provide the following string 
as user id: " ' OR '1'='1' " and "anything" as a 




WHERE userid = '' OR '1' = '1' 
AND password = 'anything'  
As the inputs of the web application are not properly 
validated, the use of the single quotes has turned the 
WHERE SQL command into a two-component clause. 
The '1' = '1' part guarantees to be true regardless of 
what the second part contains. This will allow the 
attacker to bypass the login form without actually 
knowing a valid username / password combination.  
In this paper, we use SQL injection as an example, 
which indicates that invalidated inputs to web 
applications are simply in front of dangerous SQL 
injection attacks. 
 
3.4 Existing Methodologies 
 
The Unified Modeling Language (UML) is the 
industry standard for designing software systems, but it 
only includes minimal capabilities for representing 
security aspects of a system. Therefore, methodologies 
like SecureUML, UMLpac, and UMLsec etc. present 
an extension to UML, which enables security attributes 
to be easily integrated into UML. We now review these 
methodologies in detail. 
 
3.4.1 SecureUML 
The main goal of SecureUML is to develop a 
complete model driven approach for developing secure 
e-commerce systems. SecureUML is an extended 
model for role based access control (RBAC). Access 
control infrastructures can be generated from 
SecureUML models and prevent errors during the 
realization of access control  policies .As RBAC lacks, 
support for expressing access control conditions that 
refer to the state of a system, the concept of 
authorization constraints was introduced. In other 
words, SecureUML offers important design flexibility 
because it combines the simplicity of a graphical 
notation for RBAC with the power of logical 
constraints on models but the main drawback is that it 
just focuses on access control and lacks features to 
integrate all security aspects into the design of a 
security sensitive system [12].  
 
3.4.2 UMLsec 
UMLsec presents a way to implement secure-systems 
in UML [17]. In UMLsec, validation rules that 
evaluate a model against included security 
requirements are given. 
 
3.4.3 UMLpac 
UMLpac makes it possible for developers to layout 
security features onto UML class diagram of a system. 
By using security packages in UMLpac, a level of 
abstraction is created between the class diagram and 
the security features. It is important to say that 
SecureUML can be integrated into UMLpac through 
the use of a security package having a principle 
security descriptor for SecureUML and UMLsec can 
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be used effectively with UMLpac to layout security 
features in security tiles [19]. 
All in all, none of these methodologies incorporate 
input validation, and ignorance of this feature leads to 
almost all security attacks.  
 
3.5 Validating Models and Strategies 
 
There are three validation models or strategies for 
validating data [1]: 
1) Rejecting bad data: creating a set of undesirable data 
and rejecting them. This model is also known as “black 
list” approach. 
 
2) Accepting only known good data: data constrained 
by Five Primary Security Input Validation Attributes 
(FPSIVA) which are: type, length, character set, 
format, reasonableness. Data is rejected unless it 
matches for known good data. This model is also 
known as “white list” approach. 
 
3) Sanitizing data: sanitizing a defined set of dangerous 
data so that it does not pose a threat to the software. 
 
The first model has bottom-up approach and software 
developer should predict all malicious data that is 
dangerous for software. This model heavily depends on 
methods that attacks execute if attacker changes attack 
method, software would be vulnerable. 
The third model faces the same disadvantage of the 
first model since a black list must be created. In this 
model software developer would create a list of 
sanitize patterns which would be employed to sanitize 
dangerous data. However at times a software developer 
does not exactly know all types of dangerous data, 
hence s/he is not able to define complete sanitized list. 
So software would be vulnerable. 
The second model has top-down approach where the 
software developer makes a defined set of data 
attributes which allow eligible and safe data to flow 
into the software. Actually, this set makes limitation on 
collection of data that are expected to be processed by 
software. In this model each condition validates data 
for type, format, length, character set, and 
reasonableness and if data conform to the set of 
defined attributes, they would be used in software, 
otherwise they would be rejected.  
We now explain the definition and importance of 
these FPSVIA from security perspective: 
 
• Type: this attribute makes limitation on type of 
data. Common data types are Integer, Boolean, 
Strings, and Byte. This attribute can restrict 
attacker to input other data types into the software. 
For instance, according to section 3.3.1, if 
software developer validates user id field data type 
as an integer attacker can not inject his/her 
malicious command since it contains String data 
type. 
• Format: this attribute defines data syntax which 
indicates how data should be represented in 
software. The security importance of this attribute 
is that it does not allow malicious data format are 
followed in software which can cause 
unpredictable software process. For example, 
email address should contain at sing '@' character. 
So, software developer defines a format for email 
address that check for this character. Otherwise 
attacker can input invalid email addresses. 
• Length: this attribute limits counts of data 
characters. By itself, this attribute can restrict 
many attackers’ malicious command to input into 
software. According to section 3.3.1, interestingly, 
this attribute can prevent attacker to inject 
malicious SQL queries. For instance, Attacker is 
no able to comprise user id field by malicious 
queries bigger than eight characters, if software 
developer limit user id field to eight characters 
long. 
• Character set: this attribute defines characters 
types. Common characters types include Numbers, 
Alphabets, Symbols, and combination of them. 
Character set is the most important security 
attribute among other since it limits valid 
characters in each data type. Consequently, 
attacker is not able to input dangerous characters. 
For instance, according to section 3.3.1, attacker 
can not inject single or double quote in SQL user 
authentication query in order to bypass 
authentication if software developer defines a [0-
9] domain as valid characters set for user id field. 
• Reasonableness: the last attribute is the only 
attribute that directly deals with semantic part of 
each data. This attribute is employed for detecting 
which data are reasonable and which are not. The 
importance of this attribute backs to semantic part 
of software security which has been challenging 
issue. In addition, it can be used for preventing 
future malicious activities that are not known 
today. For example, according to section 3.3.1, by 
defining reasonable user id range, attacker can not 
submit negative value as user id. 
 
Obviously, it is clear for software developer what 
kind of data should input into/output from the software 
and commonly, software developers store input data in 
variables which can be used for future usages in 
software. For instance, if a software gets users’ age and 
stores it in a variable, it is obvious that a valid type of 
this variable is integer, a valid length is two or three 
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numbers long, a valid character set is combination of 
numbers from zero to nine, a valid format is two or 
three following numbers without any space among 
them and finally the valid reasonableness of this 
variable is that the age should be bigger than zero. 
According to what is discussed above, it is clear that 
defining set of known good data by using FPSVIA 
does not need very strong background on security and 
a software developer can set them without any 
profound security knowledge. Thus, by using this 
strategy we would solve the problem of weak 
background on security for developers. On the other 
hand, this strategy is a good choice for having both 
security and convenience in software, because users' 
legitimate data are included in white list and exactly is 
defined by FPSVIA. These kind of data would 
followed into the software but the other data (that 
commonly come from attackers such as single quote in 
our SQL injection example) is not valid according to 
defined FPSVIA (white list), so they would be rejected 
 
4. Proposed Solution 
 
Proposed security model uses OCL as it base for 
defining FPSVIA in software design phase. The 
expressiveness of OCL was then carefully examined in 
order to make sure that this notation could express 
security constraints [7]. The key issue was analyzed 
and it conformed that OCL is a sustainable and 
efficient technology to improve reliability and security 
when it can be combined by FPSIVA of the proposed 
security model. Until now, anything on OCL is about 
the functions of objects and none of them talks about 
what is entering to the object and what constraints it 
has.  UML modelers can use OCL to specify 
application specific constraints in their models. By 
using OCL, In our proposed security model , we define 
five new constraints based on FPSIVA, each of these 
new constrains validate some part of input data, 
ultimately by employing all of them, according 3.2, we 
suppose to have secure input validated software. 
Constraints are as flow: 
 
• var.type :< type>  
This constraint validates the type of input data and if 
it conforms to the <type> it is acceptable, or else it 
should be rejected. For example the type of input data 
for a phone number should be Integer: 
phone_number.type: Integer  
 
• var.format :< pattern> 
This constraint validates the format of input data if it 
conforms to the <pattern>, it is acceptable or else it 
should be rejected. According to 2.2, the format of 
input data can be defined by using regular expression. 
For example, the format of a phone number is like: 
%d-%d%d%d-%d%d%d-%d%d%d%d. Each “%d” is a 
representative of decimal number which means that 




• var.length :< number> 
This constraint validates the length of input by 
maximum length of characters include in input data. 
For example, phone number has 14 numbers long: 
phone_number.length: 14 
 
• var. charset:< pattern> 
When data is entering the software, this part checks 
its characters domain with its <pattern>. We define 
character set of input data by regular expressions. For 
example, the domain of characters which are 
acceptable for phone number is from 0 to 9. 
phone_number.charset: [0-9] 
 
• var.value :< reasonableness> 
This constraint presents which values of input data 
are reasonable. For example, only human's age bigger 
than zero are reasonable. 
age. value>0 
 
Below, we represent the use of these five constraints 
on some UML diagrams. Four UML diagrams 
demonstrated here are: Use Case diagram, Class 
diagram, Sequence diagram, and Activity diagram. Our 
proposed model constitute from these four UML 
diagrams in which each diagram represents unique 
view of input validation modeling. 
 
4.1 Use Case Diagram 
 
As documented in [5], there are numerous kinds of 
security requirements. Like any other type of quality 
requirement, security requirements should be based on 
an underlying quality model. Security signifies the 
degree to which valuable assets are protected from 
significant threats posed by malicious attackers .Thus, 
as a quality factor, we can add input validation because 
as mentioned before in section 3.5, each kind of 
security requirement typically has its own security use 
case that should be used to specify requirements that 
the application shall successfully protect itself from its 
relevant security threats [9]. 
Input validation use case is the extent to which a 
business enterprise, application, component, or center 
ensures that its data is validated before allowing 
request. Table 1, specifies the input validation 
requirements. In this table, a mis-user is the inverse of 
a user, someone who –intentionally or accidentally –
initiates misuse cases and whom the system should not 
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support in doing so and a misuse case is the inverse of 
a use case, a function that the system should not allow 
.In more detail, it might be defined as a completed 
sequence of actions which results in loss for the 
organization or some specific stakeholders. We now 
verify the class diagram.  
 
4.2. Class Diagram 
 
For annotating input validation on class diagram 
UML-based models, first we must define a set of 
vocabulary to express different aspects of input 
validation. The mechanisms of extending UML such as 
stereotype and constraint are used in class diagram 
[17]. Also, we use Metamodel to define abstract syntax 
of the language.  For each class that gets input from 
environment (user, other software), we define Input 
Validation Constraint (IVC). IVC is a graphical 
notation of input validation in class diagram, which is 
defining security constraint on variables of a class. As 
described in section 3.5, FPSIVA are needed for 
validating variables. This attributes constraint execute 
for variables which are submitted from environment. 
Figure 1 shows the class diagram Metamodel of input 





The “Element” is the class that must be protected and 
<<input. validation>> is IVC. 
 Because IVC is derived from UML core type 
constraint, we use the standard UML association 





Use-Case: Input Validation 
Security threat: 
The system accepts the mis-user as if the mis-user were a valid user. 
Precondition: 
The mis-user has an invalid data entry. 
System requirement Mis-user interaction User interactions 
The system shall 
recognize that the input 




The system shall 
recognize that the input 
data is valid. 
The system shall check 
the type, length, format, 
character set and 
reasonableness attribute 
of the entry data. 
 
The system shall reject 
the mis-user by canceling 
the transaction. 
 









The user input his/her 
valid data. 
Post condition: 
1) The system run all user input through validation before allowing requests to avoid insecurity. 
2) The system shall ensure that the input is validated. 
3) The system shall record the failure items. 
 
4.3. Sequence Diagram 
 
Sequence diagram is used to describe interaction 
between objects in term of sequence of messages [13, 8]. 
When this diagram is drawn, the objects which are 
valued from input can be recognized, thus we can 
distinguish the objects which need to be validated. 
Figure 2 presents the sequence diagram of validating 
input data. At the top of the diagram, we see rectangle 
that presents object and the arrows show the messages 
that exchange between objects. The user sends specific 
procedure call messages and sends data to object. For  
 
 
validating the user's data, we use specific message to 
inform it for validating input data by FPSIVA. If this 
checking is successful, the software will check other 
attributes or else a message will be sent to user. 
For example in Figure 2, the object takes data from the 
user then the software checks the type of input. If this 
attribute of input data equals with attribute of input which 
is defined for software, other attributes like length will be 
checked, like:“[input.type: true]: input . length”. For 
other attributes the process is the same. If all of above 
constraint checking is true for input data then we can 
claim that the data is valid.
           Table 1, Input Validation Use-Case  
Figure1, Class Diagram Metamodel of Input Validation 
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4.4 Activity Diagram 
 
We use the activity diagram to show the internal 
activity of input validation process. In this diagram we 
suppose that what is entered to the system is invalid, thus 
the validation process validates it. First, it validates the 
type of input data, and if it conforms to the defined type 
constraints, it is accepted and continues, otherwise the 
input data will be rejected. This process is the same for 
length, format, character set and reasonableness 
attributes. After checking all of these attributes and 
making sure that all of them conform to the defined set of 
constraints, data gets privileged to be used in software. 




4.5 Examples: Registration System 
 
Our example is a simple registration system that is used 
for registering users on the web site. The registration 
form contains four fields: name, family name, age, phone 
number. It uses simple database to store data and has two 
components: Registration and DB. Registration 
component is boundary class that interacts with users and  
DB is entry class that is used for storing data. 
 
Figure 2, Input Validation Sequence Diagram 
Figure 3, Input Validation Activity Diagram 
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4.5.1. Use Case Diagram 
Unlike normal use cases that document interactions 
between an application and its users, misuse cases 
concentrate on interactions between the application and 
its mis-users who seek to violate its security. Because the 
success criteria for a misuse case is a successful attack 
against an application, using misuse cases for 
requirement modeling are highly adoptable ways of 
analyzing security threats but are inappropriate for the 
analysis and specification of security requirements [9]. 
Figure 3 will show the registration with input validation 
as a security requirement. Validation of input data 
includes five processes that check FPSIVA. Being invalid 
from the perspective of each of the mentioned attributes, 
it can result in misuse cases which are caused by mis-
users. The traditional use case for registration is 








4.5.2. Class Diagram 
Registration class interacts with system users therefore 
it must be secure with “input validation constraint”. DB 
class does not have any interaction with system users, so 
it does not need it. Name, family name, age and phone 
number are valued from outside. So these variables must 
Figure 4, Input Validated Registration Use Case 
Figure 5, Input Validated Registration Class Diagram 
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be constrained by FPSIVA. Figure 5 shows sample input 
validated registration class diagram. 
For example we have following constraint for Name 
entity: 
• Has string as type 
• Has 10 characters long. 
• Character set contains lower case and upper case Latin 
alphabet. 
• Format is combination of character set without any 
restriction (like: John, Ali ...). 
• Must not be empty and the same as family name. 
  And so on. 
 
4.5.3. Activity Diagram 
As you see in Figure 6, at first for the name, input 
validation process checks all constraints which we show 
above the “check name”, if all input data's attributes 
conform to constraints, input data is valid and, we show it 
by “[valid]” guard on arrow. By this valid data go to 
other part to check for family name and the other process 
is the same for age and phone number. But if it does not 
conform to all constraints it is invalid which we show by 
“[invalid]” guard on arrow, and the system rejects data to 
check it again. After all these checks are done, if it can 
pass all security constraints it means that input data is 




    As described in section 3.2, we used regular expression 
in order to define set of known legitimate data. Defining 
good regular expressions which make clear distinguish 
among malicious data and legitimate data are very 
important. Sometimes bad-defined regular expressions 
can allow malicious data flow in software that may cause 
dangerous security flaws or on the other hand, disallow 
legitimate data to flow on software that cause user 
frustration. Hence, in future study an improved model 
can be suggested in which decrease input validation 
dependencies on good-defined regular expression. Also, 
by doing numerical analysis, classifying more attacks and 
testing input validated software, these five primary 
security input validation attributes can be reduced or 
other attributes would be employed that are more robust 
and efficient.  
 
6. Conclusion and Future Works 
 
   An overall aim of the work presented in this paper is to  
 
provide an integral guideline for software developers to 
create more secure software and we introduce an 
approach which is based on input validation to improve 
the integration of security details into UML diagrams 
using the OCL.  
Input validation is part of security engineering policies. 
The integration of security engineering into a model 
driven software development approach has some 
advantages:     
 
• We can address security requirements at a high level of 
abstraction. 
• We can use the information of the model to recognize 
the design errors and correct them. 
• We save more budget. 
Indeed, modeling input validation in UML has some 
advantages such as: 
• Preventing from common input tampering attacks 
include: forced browsing, remote command injection, 
cross site scripting, buffer overflows, format string 
attacks, SQL injection, cookie poisoning, and hidden 
field manipulation. 
Figure 6, Input Validated Registration Activity Diagram 
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• Having both security and convenience in software at 
high level of abstraction. 
• Ability of solving the problem of weak security 
background for developers.  
Input validation in UML is not addressed previously. In 
this paper we incorporated input validation into UML 
diagrams such as use case, class, sequence and activity 
and illustrated a simple example to show how our 
methodology can be applied. Thus, the advantages 
mentioned make our approach an extremely useful 
approach and an ideal way to design more secure 
software in the future. 
Regarding this study, in future research, one can decrease 
the number of input validating steps using numerical 
analysis methods and by so doing, the efficiency of this 
method will be improved. 
Also, a researcher may try to discuss output validation or 
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